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CHILDREN OF A LESSER GOD: GDR
LAWYERS IN POST-SOCIALIST GERMANY
Inga Markovits*

Historical events create their own vocabulary. One of the new
words spawned by the collapse of socialism is "lustration": the vetting
process by which former socialist officials are examined for their involvement in perversions of justice under the old regimes and for their
suitability to be employed by the new ones. East European countries
have thrown themselves into the task with differing amounts of energy.
Some countries, like Russia and Bulgaria, consumed with more urgent
problems, barely have bothered. Others, like Hungary and the former
Czechoslovakia, passed lustration statutes that promptly were attacked
for violating constitutional principles that lustration indirectly was intended to promote. In Poland, legislators found it so difficult to agree
on the goals and methods of the cleansing process that seven different
drafts of lustration laws failed in parliament. 1 No other country tackled
the job as thoroughly as Germany, where reunification on October 3,

* Friends of Joe Jamail Professor of Law, The University of Texas. Dr. jur. 1967,
Freie Universitiit Berlin; LL.M. 1969, Yale. This essay is part of a larger research project on the rise and fall of socialist law in the GDR, reflected in everyday legal life in
one East German town, in the work of its trial court, and in the experience of the
court's staff and its users. I am very grateful to the German Volkswagen-Stiftung without whose generous help I never could have embarked on this project, nor carried out
the extensive fieldwork it reqµired. I also owe thanks to the National Science Foundation: both for its support of a related study investigating changes in East German legal
reasoning accompanying the collapse of socialism (Grant# SES - 9210575), and for the
financial help that enabled me to spend a rewarding year at the Center for Advanced
Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford (Grant# SES - 9022192), where the present paper was completed. My stay at the Center was also supported by a Faculty Research Assignment from the University of Texas whose help is gratefully
acknowledged.
All personal quotes in this paper stem from interviews connected with these two
projects. To protect the anonymity of the people I write about, I have renamed my town
Liiritz and have omitted all attributions of quotations that might reveal the identity of
the speaker. My empirical data, unless otherwise attributed, are based either on court
files from the Liiritz District Court or on records concerning the Liiritz court or concerning other matters of judicial administration that originally were kept by the former
GDR Ministry of Justice and now are on file with the Bundesarchiv in Potsdam.
1. For an overview of East European lustration efforts see Andrea Stauber, Die
Geset;,gebung der ehemaligen Ostblockstaaten zur Bewiiltigung ihrer sozialistischen
Vergangenheit, 49 NEUE Jusnz [NJ] 455 (1995).
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1990, brought a sweeping exchange of bureaucratic elites on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).
You might say that Germany's lustration policy was shaped and facilitated by the Berlin Wall. Though it had tumbled down, the Wall still
lived in people's memory. It still could serve to draw the line between
those to be vetted and those who were to do the vetting and thus helped
to avoid the conundrum plaguing other East European countries, where
guilty and innocent, purged and purgers, were harder to distinguish.
And unlike elsewhere in Eastern Europe, posts from which tainted officials had been ousted in East Germany could be filled with applicants
from the West, so that former Party hacks did not have to be left in office just for want of a replacement. The Wall, and its continued presence in people's minds, made the lustration process in Germany more
ruthless, but arguably also more principled, than elsewhere since decisions whether to remove or not to remove someone from office could
be made by outsiders rather than by those themselves entangled in
events, and could be reached without concern for such mundane matters
as the need to keep things going.
In this essay, I want to investigate German vetting policies by
looking at one particular subgroup of examinees: GDR lawyers. In Germany, no other former socialist elite has been submitted to so thorough
an ideological cleansing process as the legal profession. After reunification, all GDR judges and prosecutors hoping to remain in office had to
undergo investigations that by March 1994 had left only 9.2% of their
former numbers in permanent positions. 2 Virtually all East German law
professors were removed from their university posts.3 More than 5000
attorneys in Germany's eastern half are currently being examined for

2. My figure is based on the data provided by a 1994 inquiry by the East German
law journal Neue Justiz of the justice administrations of the new East German states.
See Obernahme ostdeutscher Richter und Staatsanwiilte in den Justizdienst auf Lebenszeit, 48 NJ 266 (1994). The percentage of East Germans among Germany's judges is
likely to have risen since then because not all readmitted East German judges and prosecutors, at the time of the inquiry in March 1994, had successfully completed their
three-year trial program during which a candidate for the Bench does not yet have tenure. In 1989, the GDR employed 1493 judges and 1237 prosecutors. See Hubert
Rottleuthner, Zur Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR, in STEUERUNG DER Jusnz IN DER
DDR 28 (Hubert Rottleuthner ed., 1994). Of that total of 2730 officials, 1083, or
39.7%, were admitted into the nontenured trial stage. Obernahme ostdeutscher Richter
und Staatsanwiilte in den Justizdienst auf Lebenszeit, supra, at 266. Of these, by March
1, 1994, 251 had obtained tenure. Even with new probationary judges receiving tenure
after March 1, 1994, I would not expect the percentage of formerly socialist judges in
East Germany to more than double.
3. See INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: AN EAST-WEST GERMAN DIARY 86-87,
99-102, 128-39, 177, 186, 192 (1995).
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former contacts with the State Security apparatus (Stasi) 4 and other
transgressions.5 And of all prosecutions for "government crimes" committed by socialist officials, between 75% and 80% are directed at former judges and prosecutors accused of miscarriages of justice.6
It makes sense for the new inquisitors to concentrate their efforts
on lawyers. Essentially, the move from socialism to capitalism can be
described as a change in legal paradigms: from Plan to contract; from
criminal law, ensuring citizens' compliance, to constitutional law, protecting their rights; from Party rule to the rule of law. Those functionaries who most intimately were involved in the socialist administration
of justice therefore also would seem least suitable to hold office in the
new Rechtsstaat. Still, it is ironic that Germany now, at the supposedly
festive reunion of its estranged halves, should choose a vetting policy
far more rigorous than at previous ideological turnabouts in its history.
In 1918, the Weimar Republic absorbed the judiciary of imperial Germany without visible qualms: although judges were offered retirement
at full pay if they could not, in good conscience, switch their loyalty
from a monarchy to a democracy, only 0.15% made use of the offer.7
Hitler, too (although he called lawyers "the perfect nincompoops" 8),
did not get rid of the legal professionals he inherited from the Weimar
Republic; on the contrary, he found bourgeois judges and prosecutors
willing and useful accomplices in the creation of what Carl Schmitt
called "the national-socialist Rechtsstaat. " 9 Nor did the West Germans,
for their part, dismiss the Third Reich judiciary when in 1949 they set
out to establish the rule of law. Turning their backs on earlier Allied at-

4. Stasi stands for MiniSterium fiir Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security),
which employed an army of secret informers who kept tabs on the population.
5. See M. Kleine-Cosack, Anwaltliche Berufsverbote auf dem Priifstand, 48 NJ
246 (1994). The review is based on the Statute on Examining the Admissions of Attorneys and Notaries (Gesetz zur Priifung van Rechtsanwaltszu/assungen) of July 24, 1992,
BUNDESGESE1ZBLAIT, TEIL I [BGBl. I] 1386 (F.R.G.).
6. The estimate is provided by ·M. Lemke, Stand der Aufarbeitung von DDRUnrecht durch die Strafjustiz, 49 NJ 237, 238 (1995). Lemke reports that in 1995, Berlin prosecutors alone were investigating about 7,000 suspected cases of Rechtsbeugung
(literally, "bending the law") by GDR judges and prosecutors. Only very few of the
prosecutions have led to convictions.
7. See !NGO Mfu.LER, FURCHTBARE JURISTEN. DIE UNBEWALTIGTE VERGANGENHEIT
UNSERER JUSTIZ 20 (1988).
8. HiTLERs TISCHGESPRACHE IM FlrnRERHAUPTQUARTIER 213 (Henry Picker ed.,
1951).
9. Carl Schmitt, Was bedeutet der Streit um den "Rechtsstaat" ?, 95 ZEITSCHR!Ff
FiiR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFf 198 (1935). For a case study of the adaptation of
supposedly "apolitical" civil law adjudication to Nazi ideology, see RAINER SCHRODER,
" ..• ABER IM Z!VILRECHT SIND DIE RICHTER STANDHAFf GEBLIEBEN." DIE URTEILE DES
OLG CELLE IM DRIITEN REICH (1988).
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tempts at de-nazifying the Western Zones' administration of justice,
they soon began to reemploy former Nazi judges and prosecutors, and
by 1951, the so-called "Article 131 Statute" had settled for good the
question left open by the Basic Law - what to do about Nazi public
servants - by providing for their almost complete reintegration. 10 Only
the East German Communists drummed out the lawyers they, in tum,
had inherited from the Nazis. While on May 8, 1945, about 80% of all
judges in the Soviet Occupation Zone had been members of Hitler's
NSDAP, already by December 1945, vetting campaigns had reduced
that percentage to 22%. 11 By the end of 1950, 63% of East German
judges and 89% of East German prosecutors, their ranks by now almost
completely purged of ex-Nazis, were instead members of East Germany's Communist Party, the SED. 12
Are the Germans getting it right this time? Would the integration
of socialist legal professionals i_nto East German public life indeed frustrate its renewal by obstructing the creation of a rule of law, which the
integration of Nazi lawyers did not do in the case of the West German
Federal Republic, or by preventing a reconciliation with the past, which
the West German absorption of Nazi lawyers may well have done? I
will try to answer this question by looking at East German law and lawyers from the perspective of everyday socialist life. Much of what I will
say in the following pages is based on court files and interviews from
one small East German town that I shall call Liiritz: a county seat with
about 55,000 inhabitants and a hinterland of villages and agricultural
collectives. Despite its size and location, Liiritz was no backwater. it
had a busy port, a large shipyard, several important factories, an engineering academy, a sizable Soviet garrison, and, as the major town of
the district, a Kreisgericht (District Court), which in 1988 employed
five judges and handled an annual load of about 1000 cases.
While my Liiritz findings do not provide a random sample of legal
data on the GDR, we need not worry that they misdescribe everyday
practice. East German policy put such a high premium on the "uniformity of the law" that great efforts were made to standardize judicial
output across the entire country. Local judicial statistics were reported
constantly to Berlin, even minor departures from the national average

10. See Mfiu.ER, supra note 7, at 208.
11. On the East Gennan replacement of fonner Nazi judges with Socialist judges,
see HILDE BENJAMIN ET AL., ZUR GESCHICIITE DER REclrrSPFLEGE DER DDR 1945-1949, at
71 (1976).
12. SED stands for Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands (Socialist Unity
Party), the East Gennan Communist Party. See generally HILDE BENJAMIN ET AL., ZUR
GESCHICIITE DER REclrrSPFLEGE DER DDR 1949-1961, at 66 (1980).
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were commented on by superior courts and required explanation, and
local case law deyiating from the norm was brought quickly back into
line. But my Lilritz data, though most likely typical, are incomplete:
they do not cover some of the most egregious miscarriages of justice
that Westerners expect to find everywhere in socialist legal systems and
that in East Germany happened primarily in certain settings. In Lilritz,
as elsewhere in the GDR, politically touchy offenses were not investigated by the regular police but by State Security and were not prosecuted before the local court but in the regional capital; in serious cases,
before the second instance Regional Court (Bezirksgericht),· in lesser
cases, before the capital's own and carefully staffed District Court. Political prisoners were detained in Stasi-prisons, again in the regional
capital. What qualified as a "political" case would be determined by
the regional prosecutor or the Regional Court director13 and changed
over time. While in the second half of the 1980s, attempts to "flee the
Republic," for example, appeared so ordinary that most cases were
tried locally, even minor acts of civic defiance, such as placing a postcard of Rosa Luxemburg with her famous "Freedom is always the freedom of those who think differently" into one's window, were considered threatening enough to be dealt with in the regional capital by
judges and prosecutors specializing in such cases.
Defendants tried before these special judges and panels - the "Iapanels" - did not on that account alone receive harsher sentences than
those tried locally..Someone caught while attempting to cross the border, for example, had to reckon with a much more severe penalty
handed down by a Lilritz judge than a Rosa Luxemburg fan would receive in the regional capital. In fact, the group of defendants whose
penalties, in Western eyes, were most out of proportion to their actual
deeds - people accused of asocial and work-shy behavior, who often
received lengthy prison sentences 14 - in East German terms were not
political offenders at all and routinely were tried before local courts. Of
course, we would consider all these "offenses" political and would be

13. The regional court, upon request of either the regional prosecutor or the court's
own director, could assume jurisdiction over all criminal, civil, family, and labor law
cases "if the significance, consequences or implications" of the case so warranted. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Court Organization Act) of Sept 27, 1974, § 30, <JI 1, GESETZBLATI DER DDR, Tun. I [GBl. I] 457 (G.D.R.)
14. Under § 249 of the STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] (Criminal Code) of the GDR,
"infringements of public order and security through asocial behavior" - mostly persistent refusal of employment combined with petty property offenses and/or violations of
child support obligations - could be punished with up to five years in prison. In LUritz,
in 1979, the average penalty under§ 249 was 18 months in prison. By comparison, the
overall average penalty, including sentences under § 249, was eight months in prison.
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right to expect that, by our standards, political defendants were treated
more harshly by. East German criminal law than others were. 15 But
whether that treatment was meted out by a "Ia" judge or by his local
district court colleague depended largely on the perceived need for secrecy in these cases. "Embarrassing" offenses (and that could include
anything from treason to writing a letter to a West German radio station) went to the regional capital. "Ordinary" transgressions were dealt
with at home.
My Liiritz data thus exclude many of those incidents, whether minor or grave, that East German authorities were particularly eager to
hide from Western view. But it must be remembered that they were also
hidden from East German eyes. Ordinary citizens would learn of these
incidents only through rumor. Ordinary judges or prosecutors would not
be involved in their adjudication. Ordinary lawyers would, as a rule, not
have "political" clients: the right to represent defendants before "Ia"
panels was reserved to a small group of specially selected attorneys in
which no Liiritz lawyer ever was included. And ordinary defendants
were different from those whose political reticence would cause them to
appear before a "Ia" judge in the regional capital. Most Liiritz defendants belonged to the grumpy and reluctantly loyal majority in the GDR
rather than to that tiny group of dissenters that only in the last few
months and weeks of the GDR's existence reached any noticeable
proportions.
By drawing on Liiritz files and on interviews with Liiritz officials
and citizens for my portrait of socialist legal professionals, I thus draw
on legal experiences shared by most inhabitants of the GDR and should
arrive at a more realistic likeness than those studies of socialist law and
lawyers that take their cues only from the most visible and most outrageous socialist perversions of justice. How did East German jurists
adapt to the judicial system they worked with? What hopes and fears,
what instincts and habits were nurtured in their day-to-day legal lives?
We cannot determine the proper place for former GDR lawyers in the
capitalist present unless we know something about their socialist past.
So our first question should be: who were these East German lawyers?

***
Unlike Western lawyers, who are jacks-of-all-trades and are present wherever power and influence is wielded in capitalist countries,
East German lawyers (like those of other East European states) were

15_. See MARKovrrs. supra note 3, at 38.

2276

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2270

not generalists, but trained to be specialists. 16 After a common start,
East Gennan law students were divided into two subgroups: future
judges, attorneys and prosecutors followed the "justice" curriculum,
while those meant to serve as legal counsel to the state-owned economy
(Justiziare) followed the "economics" curriculum. Their specialization
was reinforced by their· physical segregation: future judges and attorneys were trained at the Humboldt University in Berlin, future economic lawyers at the universities of Halle and Leipzig, and future prosecutors in Jena. Both curricula shared a heavy dose of ideological
training: about one-third of total class hours. The more traditional law
courses focused on doctrine rather than practice, with far more time
spent on black-letter law than on clinical exercises. At least in later
years, politically touchy subjects (such as crimes against the state)
tended either to be glossed over or to be taught by special instructors
brought in from the Stasi-Academy in Potsdam-Eiche. The segregation
of political academics from ordinary professors encouraged a feeling of
intellectual respectability among law teachers proper.
On the whole, East Gennan legal training was job-oriented rather
than scholarly. Only a few authorized law books - one in each field served as teaching texts: students were not to be confused with a multitude of sources and views. Studies were highly structured, with many
classes shared by students grouped by year of entry or common seminar
attendance. Feelings of collectivity were strengthened by students' accommodation in common residence halls, by their universal membership in the Free Gennan Youth movement and their almost universal
membership in the Communist Party, and by a superior teacher-student
ratio than in West Gennan universities, which allowed for close and
often friendly contacts Between students and instructors. All in all, the
system was geared to produce reliable, cooperative, unselfish technocrats, trained in the application of state rules to that particular area of
public endeavor for which they had specialized. Unlike capitalist lawyers, East Gennan lawyers were not preoccupied with processes but
with state-defined outcomes.
Not surprisingly, as a professional group, they looked much more
modest than their self-assured Western counterparts. East Gennan law
graduates were younger than those coming from West Gennan universities: law studies lasted four years, but even with the obligatory military
service or, for women, some sort of production work prior to university
16. On the training of East German lawyers, see DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, IMPRES·
SIONS OF LAW IN EAST GERMANY: LEGAL EDUCATION AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN TiiE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (1986); Inga Markovits, Book Review, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 198
(1988).
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entry, one could be a judge or prosecutor by age 24. The GDR legal
profession had m!IDY more female members than in the West: just over
half of the East German judiciary, for example, was made up of women.17 Lawyers were much more likely to be of working-class background than in the West, 18 even though the official goal of proportional
representation of all social classes in the judiciary was eventually abandoned and the term "class-background" could be subject to manipulation. And they were far less affluent than in the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG): judges and prosecutors would make between DM
1400 and DM 1600 (about $1000) a month before taxes, 19 counsel to
state-owned enterprises somewhat niore, and all three groups considerably less than electricians or plumbers. With the exception of the attorneys (who were supposed to join some party though not necessarily the
SED), virtually all jurists were Party members. Unlike West German
judges who claim as part of their judicial independence the right- to
come and go to work as they please, East German judges and prosecutors had fixed working hours and were expected to remain in their offices. They were not allowed to travel to the West, not allowed to have
"West contacts" even by mail, not allowed to watch Western television,
and many of them, if you ask them today, will tell you that they followed these rules almost until the end.
Only East German attorneys occasionally showed some of the features we usually associate with capitalist lawyers. Maybe they were a
little more aggressive, showing a little more freewheeling flair than
their state-employed colleagues. Their group contained far fewer women than the three other subgroups of the East German legal profession20 and probably for reasons familiar to Western women: because, as
one male lawyer suggested to me with a knowing smile, "women and
mothers were not quite up to the pressures of success." Attorneys certainly were the biggest earners among East German lawyers. But even
they made most of their money in that area of law that in the West

17. On the feminization of the GDR 's legal profession and its continued impact in
the new East German states, see Gisela Shaw, Juristinnen in den neuen Bundesliindern,
15 ZEITSCHRIFf f'iiR REc:HrSSOZIOLOGIE 191 (1994).
18. See Helmut Steiner; Social Origin and Structural Pattern of the Body of
Judges in the GDR, 67 LAW & LEGIS. G.D.R. 49 (1967).
19. My figures applied to Liiritz judges in 1980. For data reflecting somewhat
lower payscales for trial court judges and prosecutors in 1975 (DM 1200 to DM 1430)
see Andreas Gangel, Richter in der DDR - Wunschbild und Realitiitsausschnitte, in
STEUER DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 395, 407.
20. In 1980, 18.4% of all East German attorneys were women. See Hubert
Rottleuthner, Das Ende der Fassadenforschung: Recht in der DDR (Tei[ 1), 15 ZEITSCHRIFf f'iiR RECIITSSOZIOLOGIE 208, 236 (1994).
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tends to be rather low-status: divorce law. It says something about the
socialist legal profession if the same reason (women and children make
unimpressive clients) that in the West contributes to the low status of
family law in the East ensured the legal vitality of this kind of work:
private quarrels between husbands and wives were far enough removed
from issues of state importance to allow a lawyer the unabashed use of
the tricks of his trade. Other East German legal professionals, by the
way, would occasionally complain about the attorneys' unseemly interest in money, and I don't think that it was only envy that caused them
to gripe: they found the self-absorbed hunting for profit morally
offensive.

***
How useful were socialist lawyers to the state or their clients? Let
us begin with the judges. From its earliest days, adjudication in the
GDR was seen as an exercise in political authority. Judges were functionaries rather than watchmen, aligned with and dependent upon the
state rather than charged to supervise its activities. Clashes between individual and government were not considered proper subjects for judicial inquiry. The law should not stand between the socialist state and its
citizens. Almost until the end, East German law thus knew no judicial
review of administrative decisions, and when in December 1988, a halfhearted reform finally introduced toothless review in a limited number
of cases,21 the new law carefully avoided any confrontation between citizen and government in the courtroom and defined the administration's
role in the proceedings not as that of a "party" but only as that of a
(supposedly aloof and benevolent) "participant. " 22 As in other East European states, East Gerinan citizens could lodge informal complaints
against their government and did so frequently and persistently. But the
complaint process involved neither judges nor attorneys and was governed primarily by internal rules - a sometimes promising but essentially "lawless" process.23
Even in situations in which East German citizens could sue the
state - namely, in its proprietary role as landlord, employer, or pro-

21. A 1988 statute introducing judicial review ill a very limited number of cases
came into force only on July 1, 1989, and remained totally ineffective. See Gesetz iiber
die Zustiindigkeit und das Verfahren der Gerichte zur Nachpriifung von Verwaltungsentscheidungen of Dec. 14, 1988, GBl. I 327 (G.D.R.) [hereinafter NachpriifungsgesetzJ,
22. See Nachpriifungsgesetz § 8, 'JI 2, GBl. I 327 (1988).
23. On the workings of the East German complaint system see Inga Markovits,
Rechtsstaat oder Beschwerdestaat? Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der DDR, 31 RECIIT IN
OST UND WFST 265 (1987).
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vider of sales and services - they rarely did so. In the 1980s, only
about seven perc~nt of the civil law suits in the Liiritz District Court involved cases in which a citizen took some state-run store, trade organization, or the like to court. Most private litigation in the GDR was between citizens.24 And if East German citizens sued each other, a large
proportion of cases would involve disputes over objects or objectionable types of behavior rather than money: 25 personal quarrels between
people living too close for comfort. In labor law, the vast majority of
cases was not, as in the West, brought by employees against their employers but by employers against their negligent or undisciplined employees. In these suits, socialist managers would not look for financial
redress but would seek to impress proper standards of a socialist work
ethic upon the defendant and his or her fellow employees.26
Compared to private litigation in capitalist countries, which mostly
turns on money, East German civil litigation had lost much of its Midas
touch. Instead, it concerned itself with social and interpersonal relationships. Accordingly, East German judges would focus not so much on
the efficient processing of private claims as on education and
peacekeeping. They were expected to investigate thoroughly the social
context of disputes and could do so at their own initiative. Even hearings in minor civil cases, by West German standards, took very long:
between one-half and one-and-one-half hours. Criminal cases might
take even longer. "We started out with the primordial swamp," a judge
once told me, by which she meant: we investigated a defendant's entire
social career beginning from childhood. Even when dealing with the
more unruly children of the system such as fugitives or people accused
of "work-shy behavior," East German judges primarily seem to have
seen themselves as educ·ators and social workers.
In Bonn, Uwe-Jens Heuer, formerly a member of the GDR Academy of Sciences and now a deputy of the Party of Democratic Socialism (the SED's successor party), once called the East German political
system "eine Erziehungsdikta~ur" ("a pedagogic dictatorship"), and
24. In 1982, 66.8% of all plaintiffs and 93.3% of all defendants in first instance
civil law disputes in the GDR were citizens. See UNPUBLISHED JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF
THE GDR, FIRsT INSTANCE - CIVIL LAW 2 (1982). In LO.ritz, in the same year, 70.8% of
all civil law litigation took place between citizens.
25. In the LO.ritz District Court, out of 154 civil lawsuits in 1982, 31 % pursued the
delivery or return of some object (e.g., apartment, garage, TV), 16% tried to induce certain kinds of behavior (e.g., primarily, to prevent undesirable behavior like noise, trespassing), and 53% asked for money (e.g., damages, rent payments, payment for sales or
services).
26. On the workings of East German social courts, see Inga Markovits, Pursuing
One's Rights Under Socialism, 38 STAN. L. REv. 689, 701 (1986).
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GDR judges were very much the products of that system: authoritarian,
didactic, strict towards the obstinate and willful, lenient towards the repentant and submissive, and, by Western standards, remarkably willing
to assist the court's clients in their day-to-day troubles. Every Tuesday,
during the court's "legal consultation" hours, judges gave free advice
to countless citizens. They mediated between warring spouses or neighbors, helped track down debtors of alimony or support obligations and
saw to it that they paid, made sure victims of crimes received compensation from their attackers, and always were available to collectives or
social organizations in need of a speaker. As late as 1989, a Liiritz case
file shows a judge not only securing overnight accommodation for an
out-of-town plaintiff but even supplying him with the schedule of train
connections that he had requested. Citizens expected such acts of practical assistance, and a responsible judge would not consider the tasks beneath her. They were part and parcel of her overall duties: to ensure order, peace, discipline and collective cohesion. Unlike our judges, whom
we think of as detached umpires between competing individual interests, socialist judges were political functionaries committed to asserting
the parental authority of the state.
Accordingly, judges in the GDR differed far less from prosecutors
than they would in a Western democracy. To us, judges are neutral, and
prosecutors are partisan. Under socialism, both judges and prosecutors
were partisan: not to one of the parties before them but to the Party and
its goals. They were distinguished by divisions of labor but not by different philosophies. Both were meant to uncover social malfunctionings
and to devise those responses most in line with the current political
fashion. Both the court and the prosecutor's office belonged, together
with the city's "Interior Department," the police, and the local Stasi
branch, to the so-called "security-forces" of a district, whose heads met
once a month to discuss current problems of law and order: recent border violations, a case of arson, a rise in juvenile delinquency, or any
other incident or trend disquieting to public peace or the authorities.
Both cooperated beyond their daily casework: if, for instance, in the
course of a divorce trial, the court learned of the husband's long-time
unemployment, it might inform the prosecutor of the culprit's likely
"parasitism." And both judges and prosecutors belonged to the same
Party group at the courthouse.
The cooperation sometimes led to rivalry. Both judges and prosecutors, sharing essentially similar tasks and the same superior (the Ministry of Justice), occasionally seem to have vied to show that each could
do the job better than the other. In criminal cases, for instance, it was
quite common for a judge to return the prosecutor's case "for further
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investigation" - usually, to obtain some character reference from the
defendant's work collective or to require some other evidence of collective involvement. As far as I can tell from my Luritz files, the practice
never affected the eventual outcome of a case. But it showed the judge
to be more conscientious about his job than his rival: one point chalked
up for the judge, one gets the impression, in both protagonists' common
pursuit of carefully tailored social control. There is also some evidence
of tensions between judges and the local police, and the court's occasional criticism of shoddy police work indirectly may have been aimed
at the prosecutor's office, which supervised it.
But if, essentially, judges and prosecutors were equals, the prosecutor was the more equal of the two. It was the prosecutor under whose
leadership the district's "security forces" would meet to discuss the
law-and-order concerns in their constituency. It was the prosecutor who,
as a rule, served as Party Secretary at the courthouse. The assignment
reflected the higher political status of prosecutors and the ranking of
criminal law (the prosecutor's domain) over civil and family law (with
which the prosecutor rarely would bother) in a legal system that saw
law above all as an instrument of state control.
In most cases, therefore, judges would follow the prosecutor's
lead. Prosecutorial requests for arrest warrants, for example, almost always were honored by a judge. Since we have no overall statistics on
this point, local figures must do. At the Lilritz District Court, for instance, between 1982 and 1985, out of 559 applications for arrest warrants by local prosecutors, only one was denied by a judge. Reports
from other courts show similar judicial compliance with prosecutors'
requests.27 When, apparently alarmed by such figures, the GDR Ministry of Justice launched· several campaigns in 1987 and 1988 to encourage judicial resistance to unwarranted requests for a defendant's
preliminary detention,28 the percentage of prosecutorial requests denied
by Lilritz judges increased to no more than 4% in 1987 and 5% in
1988.
Judges showed similar deference to prosecutors in their sentencing
practices. In Luritz in the 1980s, criminal law judges followed the prc;>s27. The director of the District Court Stralsund, for instance, reported at a district
court directors' meeting in December 1987 that at his court "for the first time in years"
a prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant had been rejected.
28. To educate the judiciary about important policy developments and changes, the
GDR Ministry of Justice or the Supreme Court would convene workshops and so-called
"judges' conferences," at which representatives of the Ministry or the Court would
spell out the policy in question and discuss its implications. One such conference dealing with arrest warrants and issues of preliminary detention was a conference of district
court directors on February 9-12, 1988, in Fuhlendorf.
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ecutor's penalty suggestions in about 90% of all cases. As one judge
told me, he and his colleagues were instructed by the superior court not
to deviate from the prosecutor's proposal if the deviation would amount
to no more than three months in prison - the implication being that a
mere three months was not enough to warrant public confrontation between two representatives of socialist state authority. But since it took
some pluck to defy the prosecutor's request, any deviation by more than
three months also required more than ordinary backbone. A former regional court judge, coming from one of the admittedly more exposed
"Ia" panels that dealt with political offenses, once described to me the
issue of whether to override the prosecutor's proposals in terms of a
limited number of chips each judge had at his or her disposal. "You
wanted to spend those chips very carefully," he said. As a result, most
trials at which a judge departed from the prosecutor's suggested penalty
resulted in only marginally different sentences. Complete acquittals
were practically unheard of. If they deviated, judges often complied
with the prosecutor's main request for punishment but differed on the
fringes of a case: judges changed supplementary penalties (such as the
obligation to work on community projects, for example), or, in the case
of suspended sentences, altered the period of probation suggested by the
prosecutor. Reading these cases today, one suspects that some of the deviations must have mattered more to the judge than to the defendant
himself. Such small acts of judicial insubordination also may, at least in
part, have been acts of self-assertion between two competitors: signaling the judge's claim to professional respect without seriously challenging the basic solidarity between two colleagues. I once asked an attorney to describe to me the relationship between judges and prosecutors
in the GDR. "A scary a11iance" were the words he chose.
Still, there were differences in emphasis. Both judges and prosecutors shared the pedagogical convictions driving a particular decision.
But if a judge rejected the prosecutor's penalty demands, she usually
would do so in favor of the defendant. As in the case of old-fashioned
parents, the judge, more likely to be a woman in any event, was also
more likely to play the role of the mother: stem, yes, but more willing
to find redeeming qualities in the offspring and at times more forgiving
than the rigid and authoritarian father.
Attorneys had to be outsiders in this family drama. The contrapuntal structure of Western procedure provides the defense counsel with a
natural role and place: that of a counterweight to the prosecution. Formally, socialist procedure followed a similar pattern. Substantively,
however, with judge and prosecutor firmly committed to the same so-
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cial purposes, the defense had no logical foothold in the scenario and
only could appeal to both disciplinarians' parental generosity.
· Especially in criminal cases, an attorney's procedural position was
weak. Lawyers were entitled to visit their clients in prison and to have
access to the record only after the prosecution had officially submitted
its case to the court and the court had "opened" the proceedings. During preliminary investigations, an arrested suspect could see his lawyer
only if the prosecutor consented.29 By their own account, prosecutors
were in no hurry to do so until their case had been thoroughly prepared.
But even if she allowed a pretrial visit, a former prosecutor once told
me, attorneys usually would be in no hurry to meet with their clients.
Nor did potential clients themselves appear eager to seek legal help.
There is evidence that, at least in the 1980s, suspects were told of their
right to retain a lawyer (usually on the day following their arrest)30
when they were interrogated by an examining judge, who would record
the prisoner's own version of events, perfunctorily investigate the reasons for detention, and almost always sanction it. On that occasion, suspects were also asked whom they wanted to be informed of their arrest.
Most of those arrested in Liiritz named a relative. Many said: "No
one." Nobody ever suggested that a lawyer be called.
The "right to make use of an attorney at every stage of the proceedings," even though it existed on the books,31 held no sway in socialist legal folklore. Had one ever suggested to them the need for
Miranda-sty1e32 warnings, most protagonists in the East German legal
process probably would have thought the idea absurd. If the police got
hold of you, good for them and tough luck for you. Judging by the suspects' own statements (attached to arrest warrants) and by the account
of judges and prosecutors present in the process, most of those apprehended cooperated in their interrogation, conceded their deeds, admitted
to the error of their ways, and hoped for the best. According to one
prosecutor, fewer than 1% of the suspects refused to testify. My Liiritz
files support that estimate. Alth,ough upon interrogation by the examining judge, suspects would correct police reports on factual issues ("I
did not need to break into the apartment because the door was un-

29. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure) § 64 (version
of June 28, 1979), GBI. I 139 (G.D.R.).
30. See StPO § 126, <JI 1 (1979), GBl. I 139.
31. See StPO § 61, <JI 1 (1979), GBl. I 139.
32. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a
person in custody has to be advised by the police of his right to remain silent, to consult
with an attorney, to have an attorney appointed for him if he cannot afford one, and to
be warned that any of his statements might be used against him.
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locked"), they just as likely would volunteer information on transgressions not yet uncovered by the police ("I also took a bicycle from the
hallway"). As several judges told me: "The lying started only once a
lawyer entered the stage." But since lawyers were rare participants in
the East German criminal process, most suspects confronted their interrogators with what appears to have been an honest mixture of fear, respect, trust, and the wish to unburden their chests.
Even once in court, East Germans would rarely use the services of
an attorney. Under GDR procedure, representation by counsel was
mandatory only in first-instance criminal trials before a regional court
or in cases before the Supreme Court, that is, primarily in murder or
treason cases.33 All other cases could be tried without a lawyer. There
are no national figures on how many citizens chose representation anyway. Official GDR statistics, although very thorough on other issues,
apparently considered the participation of legal counsel too insignificant
to warrant registration. According to my own data, in 1979, 15.3% of
all civil litigants and 5.6% of all criminal defendants in Liiritz had hired
a lawyer to represent them. Unlike Westerners, who would consider legal help most indispensable in confrontations with as powerful an opponent as the state, East Germans apparently found lawyers more useful in
areas removed from state authority. Towards the end of the GDR, growing disaffection with the system seems to have led its citizens to a
greater appreciation of attorneys: by 1988, in Liiritz 21.1 % of all civil
parties and 16% of all criminal defendants were represented in court.
But East German legal officials remained suspicious of attorneys until
the very end. Although in all other criminal or civil cases judges could
order representation for parties or defendants unable to represent themselves effectively,34 they·virtually never did so. Children and the handicapped, who needed some representation though not necessarily by an
attorney, 35 almost always were assigned social workers rather than lawyers to assist them. "Who needs a lawyer anyway?" East German legal
officials seem to have thought. 36 Many of them remembered a slogan
taught in law school: "The best attorney is the judge."
33. See StPO § 63, <JI l (1979), GBl. I 139.
34. See StPO § 63, <JI 1 (1979), GBI. I 139 (stating that defense counsel should be
appointed "if the issue requires it"); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] (Code of Civil Procedure) (1975), GBI. I 533 (G.D.R.) (stating that the court shall appoint a "procedural
representative" for a minor or handicapped defendant without legal guardian, or for any
party unable "to intelligibly participate in the proceedings").
35. See StPO § 72 (1979), GBI. I 139.
36. Consider one example: a 1982 Liiritz case involving an appeal against a tort
award resulting from a car accident The appellant, an insolvent father of four children
who at the time of the appeal was serving a prison sentence, asked for the assignment
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Compare this attitude to GDR practices in labor litigation, where
the representation of workers by union counsel or the participation of
union or workplace delegates in the proceedings was common.37 But
union representatives differed from lawyers in significant ways. Although they received some labor law training, they were neither legal
professionals nor intellectuals. And instead of one-sided loyalty towards
their clients, they owed loyalty to both the worker and the work collective. This ambiguity, confusing and suspicious to a Westerner, redeemed the work of union counsel in East German eyes. To socialists,
attorneys in civil law cases represented private, and very likely egotistical, interests; worse yet, defense attorneys operated as apologists for offensive and self-seeking antisocial behavior. But labor law representatives embodied collective concern for what happened at the workplace
and thus could speak up for their fellow worker without having to fear
the disapproval of a legal system suspicious of all manifestations of
self-interest. And they could also, as they frequently did, speak out
against a worker-plaintiff or worker-defendant. No wonder that their
participation in labor law cases was thought important enough to be recorded by East German judicial statistics.38
A criminal defense counsel, by comparison, had to watch his steps.
As one Lilritz lawyer described it, his "spectrum of possible options
was narrow." Asking for an acquittal was rare and could be a risky
strategy. Demanding a milder sentence than suggested by the prosecution was common but frequently ineffective; some attorneys would not
even try and instead simply seconded the prosecution's proposal. We
should not rush to condemn such strategies: as files occasionally show,
the prosecutor too (swayed, perhaps, by the defense counsel's presentation of the case?) may have intended to let the defendant off lightly.
One 1988 decision of my Lilritz District Court, for instance, in which
the defendant in a fraud case had been sentenced to nineteen months in
prison because "both prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that only a
significant deprivation of freedom could be expected to successfully reof an attorney to argue his case before the Regional Court: The Regional Court rejected
the request "since obviously, the appellant has other options for asserting his rights either himself or with the assistance of other persons."
37. In 1982, out of 12,323 district court labor law proceedings in the GDR, 14%
involved the participation of union counsel, 44% the participation of union representatives providing collective input into the deliberations, and 12% involved both union
counsel and union representatives. See UNPUBLISHED JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE GDR
- FlRsT INSTANCE, LABOR LAW 24 (1982).
38. In 1982, attorneys were involved in 8% of all district court labor law cases.
See id. Presumably, those data were of official interest, since attorneys were perceived
as competitors to the more numerous, and ideologically favored, union representatives.
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educate the offender," was promptly quashed by the Regional Court
and replaced wi~ a thirty-month term: supposedly, the lower court had
underestimated the gravity of the offense. The example shows how defense attorneys may have had to resort to devious tactics to undercut the
severity of socialist criminal law without appearing to challenge its
authority.
Often it was more promising to try to gain victories at the periphery of a case: for example, attack monetary sanctions slapped onto a
criminal penalty. Defense counsel would routinely depict their clients in
the rosiest light and dwell on their likely rehabilitation. But their main
function, as several criminal lawyers have told me, was to offer "pastoral help": cheer people up, serve as liaison between the defendant and
his relatives, help with the domestic problems caused by someone's arrest, provide a shoulder to lean on. Only in areas further removed from
state authority like civil or family law - a lawyer's main bread and
butter in any event - could GDR lawyers officially display some of
that argumentativeness and aggressiveness for which Western lawyers
are famous and infamous.
Where does that leave us? With a legal profession that unlike its
Western counterpart was not united by a common belief in individual
autonomy, the legitimacy of conflict, the sanctity of procedure, or even
by a common style. The East German legal profession showed little
professional cohesion. Although judges and prosecutors cooperated during working hours,. they rarely socialized. Attorneys not only did not
privately interact with their colleagues from the courthouse, they even
claim that such interaction was frowned upon by the Party. When I
asked them about their circle of friends, many GDR jurists took care to
point out that it did not include other legal professionals. Nor were East
German lawyers held together by that common professional language
that signals membership in a particular vocation and excludes outsiders
from its interactions. There was no such language, no real "legalese" in
the GDR: socialist law, intendipg to educate and to steer its addressees
towards socially useful goals, had to remain simple and accessible.
Lawyers' briefs used the language of the common man. Judges and
prosecutors were admonished constantly to make themselves understood
by everyone in the courtroom. The participation of so many lay people
in the East German legal process - members of social courts, lay assessors, representatives of the collective - reinforced the simple and
straightforward quality of East German law-talk. It also helped to blur
the line between lawyers and nonlawyers even further. "We were nothing special," an East German judge once told me. So why search for
special contacts with others equally unremarkable? Although virtually
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all East German jurists belonged to the Vereinigung demokratischer
Juristen der DDR. ("Association of Democratic Lawyers"), membership
seems to have existed mainly on paper. As one lawyer put it: "Oh,
them; all they ever did was pass out red armbands. " 39 It was only after
the Wende that professional association became meaningful to East German lawyers: today in Liiritz, attorneys, judges and prosecutors regularly convene over glasses of beer in a local restaurant, and attorneys
will even travel out of town for meetings of the Bar Association.

***
To summarize up to this point: the East German legal profession
was staffed by people quite unlike those we usually encounter in West
Germany's legal landscape. Moreover, the legal process itself differed
in significant ways from the legal process we know. I want to list only
some of those differences that, I believe, had the greatest impact on the
intellectual and psychological make-up of East German legal professionals and their clients.
To begin with the written word: the East German legal process was
influenced by legal texts looking singularly nonlegal to Western readers.
In our law world, written documents play an important role: they fix
events in the past and remove them from legal dispute, facilitate proof,
allow for greater precision than spontaneous oral communications, and
streamline the legal process by replacing time-consuming palavers in
court with the speedy exchange of briefs. The East German legal process, too, was deeply buried under paper. But most of those texts did
not, like ours, aim for the indisputable assertion of rights but instead
served autocratic purposes: demands for loyalty coming from above
(expressed in the endless stream of guidelines, standpoints, concepts, directives, and the like) and assurances from below that everything was
indeed proceeding according to Party wishes (such as evaluations and
self-evaluations, summaries of meetings, local progress reports, etc.).
These documents were not precise and to the point but often extraordinarily long-winded and florid: ritually repeating the most recent
Party line for pages on end until finally, almost as an afterthought, the
document's specific purposes would be mentioned ("You've got to read
them starting at the back," a Party Secretary once advised me). Much
of the vocabulary was political rather than legal, with already ambiguous terms changing their importance and meaning in line with the twists
and turns of political developments. Many of the written exchanges be39. See Howard de Nike, Die Vereinigung demokratischer Juristen in der DDR.
Ein Modell der Professionalisierung?, 14 GESCIDCHfE UND GEGENWART 139, 143 (1995).

2288

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2270

tween central and local authorities served to collect information in a society that could n9t rely on the open word; hence, for instance, the constant demands for Wochenmeldungen (reports on weekly events, which
every East German court had to submit, usually by Tuesday, to its superior court), statistics, evaluations, and progress reports. But given the
loose and loaded political terminology, success stories were easy to
fabricate. Moreover, the socialist obsession with secrecy removed even
potentially meaningful information (like statistics) from public use. 40 An
East German judge once, jokingly, translated for me the frequently used
classification "nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" ("for internal use only")
as "vor dem Lesen vernichten" ("destroy before reading") - the ultimate condemnation of the communicative value of these texts. In the
East German legal process, the written word, the traditional weapon of
Western lawyers, had lost much of its power, and whatever power it retained was in most instances wielded by the Party.
As a corollary to this development, oral communications had
gained in breadth and significance, but, again, with different functions
than in the West. In capitalist legal systems, oral proceedings are meant
to ensure authenticity and to enable those involved in a dispute to have
their say. They are linked closely to our demand for publicity, which
aims for the democratic control of the legal process: if ordinary citizens
can watch and listen to what is going on in the courtroom, those in a
position of authority will not get away with misusing their powers.
In East German law, the oral character of many interactions served
other purposes. It was meant to facilitate the participation of nonprofessionals: social courts, for instance, staffed entirely with laypeople, decided most first-instance labor disputes and many petty civil
and criminal matters in the GDR and by their very nature relied on oral
and informal transactions, with only very rudimentary written summaries available for later review and with a happy-go-lucky approach to
procedure that encouraged digressions by the judges and interference by
the spectators.41 Many communications were oral so that they would
leave no trace, such as Party deliberations preceding important decisions, or instances of that infamous "telephone justice." At times, writ-

40. Both East Gennan judicial statistics and the only Supreme Court case law collection published since 1977, the lnformationen des Obersten Gerichts der DDR (Supreme Court Infonnations), were classified "nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" ("for internal
use only") and were distributed on a need-to-know basis. Although the classification
"nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" was abolished on January 1, 1988, sensitive instructions
by the Ministry of Justice continued to be labeled "Dienstsache" (official matter) and
were numbered, and thus presumably distributed in restrictive fashion.
41. On East Gennan social courts, see Markovits, supra note 26, at 701.
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ten law issued at the top levels of government would be transformed
into oral law at lower levels: for example, politically sensitive instructions by the Supreme Court or the Ministry of Justice might be read by
a high official to lower court judges convened in so-called "judges'
conferences" that served to disseminate new policies to those who were
to apply them in the field and at which participants only took notes.
And, most importantly, communications were oral because the pedagogic purposes of socialist law called for direct and vigorous persuasion, difficult to achieve in written texts. For instance, at trials before a
"selected public," the public was not invited to monitor the proceedings but carefully chosen to include those most in need of the moral and
practical lessons a case had to offer. The technique was said to be especially effective in rent collection cases, to which the court would invite
an audience of other delinquent tenants living in the same apartment
block as the defendant. On such occasions, it could happen that some- of
the invitees felt sufficiently persuaded or pressured by the legal morality play unfolding before their eyes to pay their own rent debts right
then and there in the courtroom. A flyer, say, publicizing the court's decision among all defaulting tenants of a housing project, probably
would not have had the same result.
Reliance on oral communications in a political system bent on
Party discipline was not without its costs. Oral communications are difficult to hold to a previous game plan and difficult to check up on afterwards. As early as 1957, an inspector charged with investigating the
performance of a regional court complained to the Ministry of Justice
about the tendency of judges to base too much of their activities "on
talks across their desks," a practice that "undermines control and selfcontrol and lures people into somewhat haphazard work habits." I have
been told of cases in which the Party's reliance on the spoken word
backfired in strange fashion: as for instance in a politically touchy 1988
criminal trial in Liiritz, at which a judge from the regional Bezirksgericht, sent to make sure that. everything went according to plan, had
been instructed to dictate the District Court's judgment. The Liiritz
judge, furious, rejected the suggestion, and when she stuck to her guns,
the inspector abandoned his mission and let her have her way - with
the tacit understanding that neither would let the Regional Court Director know that it was not her emissary who had drafted the verdict.
Despite such pitfalls, reliance on face-to-face communications was
indispensable to a legal system hoping to change the character of man.
East German legal officials were great believers in Aussprachen, a term
for which I can find no English equivalent. The usual translation "talk" or "conversation" - conveys nothing of the heart-to-heart seri-
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ousness by which an Aussprache would try to lead anyone deviating
from the accepted norm (a rebellious judge, a prosecutor contemplating
divorce, a first offender not yet hardened into a criminal) back into the
fold. Aussprachen were undertaken in and out of courtrooms; in personal matters and in those of public concern; before a case went to trial
and after it had been decided; by judges, prosecutors, bosses, Party
functionaries, or administrators. Occasionally, the possibility of defusing a conflict by way of an Aussprache was mentioned in a code. 42
Mostly, Aussprachen were undertaken without specific statutory authorization. They were extralegal attempts to resolve disputes by tapping
into individual and collective human resources. The proximity between
speaker and spoken-to was meant to provide an occasion for a culprit to
confide in his interrogator, air personal problems, wake up to his obligations towards society, allow a person with authority and experience to
steer him in the right direction, and, if possible, involve collective helpers in the task. Whatever this method of dispute resolution gained in
human warmth did not come cheaply. In all Aussprachen, the oral character of the interaction facilitated overbearing or misuse of authority (no
outsider with clout was usually present to check it) and excluded most
violations of individual rights from later review (since Aussprachen virtually never left a record).
A third feature of socialist law, linked with the previous one, was
its highly personal character. A legal system aiming for collective
warmth rather than cold efficiency is much more dependent on the
human qualities of its personnel than one that contents itself with the
technical processing of claims. Whether an Aussprache, for instance,
would do its job depended at least in part on the pedagogic talents of
the official engaged in it: imaginative and tactful advice might defuse a
conflict that authoritarian righteousness would only harden. Since Aussprachen usually left no trace, we can only guess at what went on in
them. But a few files on predivorce Aussprachen at the Liiritz courthouse that for some reason wer~ recorded in the 1960s suggest that personal attributes, such as the gender of the official trying to talk a couple
out of a divorce, had much to do with his or her evaluation of the marriage conflict. While the Liiritz court secretary, at the time a woman,
tended to focus on aspects favorable to the wife, the family-law judge,
at the time a man, was much more likely to acknowledge grievances of
the husband.

42. See ZPO § 28, 'JI 2 (1975), OBI. I 533 (G.D.R.), under which a plaintiff could
be asked for an Aussprache in court, in the course of which he could be encouraged to

alter, amend, or "if so warranted" withdraw his claim. None of this was mandatory.
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With private characteristics exerting so much influence over an official's public performance, it is not surprising that the East German administration of justice placed great emphasis on the personal behavior
of judicial cadres. When in 1982 a Liirltz judge contemplates divorce,
the court's "weekly report" advises the Ministry of Justice of the fact.
When, six years later, personal quarrels erupt in the prosecutor's office,
the Ministry of Justice sends several officials to Liiritz who in nine
Aussprachen try to soothe hurt feelings and to restore collective peace.
When in the same year, one of the Liiritz junior judges, in an dispute
over a garage, sues his antagonist, the court's director simply strikes the
complaint from the docket. "A judge does not sue," she tells her colleague. A socialist role model does not engage in the petty pursuit of
self-interest.
East German court files mirror this personalized approach to socialist justice. If West German civil records reveal dry and methodic
records interspersed with receipts, balance sheets, affidavits, photocopies and the like, East German civil court files tell straightforward
human-interest stories. Since most complaints are either written or dictated by the parties themselves, they echo the passions of immediate experience. Divorce complaints are documented with lengthy personal
confessions. Civil law suits tell tales of private woes. Even the lawyers
join in the emotional fray. "The plaintiff considers it an outrage," a
Liiritz attorney writes in his brief. "The defendant is deeply pained to
hear," his colleagu.e on the opposite side replies. Exclamation marks
abound.
The personal style matches a litigation process that seemed consumed with family-style quarrels. Since in the GDR neither complaints
against administrative decisions nor contract disputes within the stateowned economy could be pursued in court, the judicial stage, as we
have seen,43 was largely left to citizens suing each other. In doing so,
East German plaintiffs and defendants defied the capitalist experience
that people closely acquainted .with each other try to avoid confrontations in court. On the contrary, human proximity in the GDR seems to
have been a stimulus for litigation. People sued each other not despite
their closeness but because of it. They got into fights, I think, because
life under socialism left so little room for personal escapes. In Liiritz,
for instance, in the 1980s, almost 60% of all civil litigation among citizens took place between parties who once had been married, had cohabited, were related to each other, or lived in the same house. If litigation
erupted over the ownership or use of things, the objects of contention
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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often were fought over not because of their monetary value but because
of the human input they embodied: a car for which the purchaser had
spent over a decade on the waiting list, or an allotment garden that had
consumed many hours of labor. Even claims for money seemed more
personal than under capitalism: in Liiritz, in 1988, 70% of all monetary
claims enforced in civil court did not originate in commercial exchanges on the market, but in private deals between private citizens, or
were not based on exchange relationships at all, such as personal injury
or inheritance claims. While West German civil litigants tend to keep at
arm's length from each other, East German litigants seemed engaged in
a kind of personal clinch.
And, finally, a fourth feature of the socialist legal process, much
made of these days and most offensive to Westerners, was its embeddedness in a tight, hierarchical command structure. The previous pages
have provided many examples. East German legal officials were always
dependent upon those above them. Contrary to common West German
beliefs, most interventions would not come from outside Party functionaries: telephone calls from the local Party Secretary were, at least in
theory, frowned upon by the system since they sidestepped central authorities and allowed for deviations and cover-ups. "Telephone justice"
of this sort could be resisted (even if it not always was). Instead, the
telephone call most likely to ring an alarm bell in a lower court judge's
mind ("What did I do wrong?") would come from the superior regional
court. Like any other aspect of socialist government, the judiciary, too,
was controlled by the principle of "democratic centralism": local
judges had to report and were responsible to the regional courts (and ultimately the Supreme Court), which in turn supervised and directed the
work of local courts. Regular inspections by teams of full-time court revisors made sure that the instructions from higher levels were carried
out below. If individual judges too persistently departed from the party
line (a few and well-spaced deviations might be tolerated), they would
be first admonished by their co:urt's director and later, if need be, called
in by the regional court and given a talking-to. The system ensured that
GDR judges usually knew what was expected of them.
But it was a far more ambiguous and contradictory system of judicial control than Westerners usually will allow. East German legal doctrine never renounced the concept of "judicial independence" proclaimed in the GDR Constitution.44 Judges were not to be told how to
decide individual cases, and if they were, it was possible to resist that
44. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR (Constitution) art. 96, <JI 1 (G.D.R.) (as amended on
Oct. 7, 1974).
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kind of crude and unveiled interference, at least in later years. But they
were meant to get their answers "right": not to find fair solutions by
impartially applying formal rules to some private dispute of concern
only to the participants, but to find the politically correct solutions to
social ills whose diagnosis and remedy usually had already been prescribed by the Party.
Only a legal system that does not claim to know all the answers
(and therefore does not favor one prospective outcome over another)
can place its faith in procedural justice. Socialist law believed in substantive justice: it knew the answers (even if those answers changed
over time) and therefore had to make sure that each individual judge
would find them. Hence the innumerable instructions, analyses, inspections and consultations constantly keeping judges abreast of the current
political line. The Party, in this scheme of things, was the medical authority on all social ills. The judge was the local practitioner treating
the patient. The responsibility - according to the official claim - remained his or hers in each individual case. The GDR Ministry of Justice's official catalogue of the qualities required in future judges thus
listed both "political steadfastness and an unfaltering commitment towards the Party" and a character trait likely to undermine that commitment: "Zivilcourage" 45 - the courage to speak up in the face of
authority.
It was an attempt to square the circle. The Party wanted to have its
cake and eat it too:. have a self-confident, vigorous, authoritative judiciary, yet be assured that it would always toe the line. East German
judges and prosecutors accepted the contradictions without visible complaints. "Judicial independence is a constitutional principle," the Lfuitz
court director, for instance, noted in her diary at an October 1983 judicial workshop convened to study the lessons of the Eleventh Party Congress. "A judge enjoys a high degree of autonomy. Judicial decisionmaking, too, is governed by the primacy of politics." And, three years
later, at a meeting for district court directors, she jotted down this
formula: "Unity of democratic centralism, individual responsibility, and
judicial independence." "Important," she added in the margin of her
notebook. I cannot imagine how the words could have made sense to
her. But as far as I can tell, most East German judges, like she, did not
question the fundamental inconsistency of their instructions but did
their best to fulfill both demands of their job: act out their limited, case-

45. See Anforderungen an die Absolventen der Sektion Rechtswissenschaft der
Humboldt-Universitiit zu Berlin of Febr. 22, 1987, cited in Gangel, supra note 19, at
400.
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by-case independence and render decisions in line with current political
priorities. They felt both burdened by the constant obligation to get it
right ("always this pressure from above," one judge confided) and
grateful for the advice and guidance of their superiors ("I always
thought that consultations were helpful," another judge said).
One way to deal with the dilemma was servility. Another was positivism: East German judges liked to stick closely to the letter of the law
since it could be trusted to reflect authoritative Party positions and, at
the same time, provided shelter against interferences from the outside.
Many judges seem to have played it by ear, stressing their "independence" when possible and their political loyalty when necessary. Those
who truly believed in socialism may have found it easiest to juggle their
conflicting tasks: sharing the Party's ultimate belief in substantive justice seems to have given socialist functionaries the confidence to interpret official goals with greater creativity and authority. But most judges,
over years of navigating the treacherous currents of democratic centralism, must have developed habits, or at least pretenses, of obedience distasteful not only to Westerners but also, possibly, to themselves. 46
At times, it seemed as if East German authorities, too, were dissatisfied with the subservience their own orders and monitoring practices
had bred. Interspersed with criticism of judges who did not toe the line,
one finds criticism of those who toed it too readily. Especially in the
1980s, directives from above encouraged GDR judges to show more
spiritedness and self-reliance: reject unjustified applications for arrest
warrants by the prosecutor, for instance, or more often appoint legal
counsel for defendants needing help. Instructions like these were taken
down duly in judges' diaries at workshops and conferences. But can independence be ordered from above, especially by authorities who
tended to take with the left hand what the right had given? Instead, I
believe, most GDR judges and prosecutors looked for meaning where
unambiguous meaning could be found more easily and identified with

46. Occasionally, one catches glimpses of such self-disdain. The Luritz files, for
instance, contain a 1986 petition of one of the court's former directors, now legal counsel to a state-owned enterprise, in which she asks the GDR Council of State, and its
Chairman, Erich Honecker, to overrule the local denial of a travel visa to West Germany to attend a parent's eighty-fifth birthday. Since East German judges and prosecutors were not allowed to have any "contacts" with the West, the writer, during her time
on the bench, had broken off relations with her family members in the Federal Republic. In her letter to Honecker, she confesses to being ashamed of her compliance.
"Sometimes, when thinking back on the meaning of our lives, we think that we have
lost respect for ourselves," she writes of herself and her husband. Her petition is denied, because the "no-contact rule" applied not only to current, but also to former
officeholders.
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the caring aspects of their work: their tasks to educate the ignorant and
faltering, protect the weaker party, keep the peace, see to it that everyone had a job and a roof over his head.

***
What follows for the attitudes of East German lawyers toward that
central element of our legal faith: our respect for legal forms and procedures? Leaving aside the "antiformalism" and "antineutralism" of its
earlier years, the East German legal system, throughout most of its history, stressed the importance of legal order and discipline. Law was the
Party's blueprint for building socialist society and had to be carried out
religiously. "Socialist legality" was defined as the "strict observance of
the law combined with Party spirit" (again, the attempt to square the
circle), and while the "Party spirit" introduced uncertainty and manipulability into the equation, the "strict observance of the law" was something socialist legal officials could hold onto. East German judges and
prosecutors were taught to work in an orderly manner and with care, to
investigate each case thoroughly and to follow exactly prescribed procedures. If local courts occasionally got their signals wrong and slipped
(no wonder, given the fundamental inconsistency of the official demands for both precision and partisanship), regional courts (who, as a
Luritz judge put it, could be "real sticklers for form") would usually
call them to order. Regular court inspections from above made sure that
everyone at the trial court level followed the rules. Reports of such inspections provide detailed, even finicky, accounts of the inspected
judges' compliance, or lack thereof, with whatever provisions governed
their work.
But the East German regard for rules lacked jurisprudential conviction. Initially, the observation of legal formalities was clearly not more
than a cover-up meant to deflect West German criticism of East German
perversions of justice: as when in a 1954 show trial, the GDR Prosecutor General criticized defense attorneys for "not having posed a single
question throughout the entire proceedings," which ended with a death
penalty for economic subversion and would have done so whatever the
efforts of the defense.47 By the early 1970s, when East Germany, like
other socialist countries, turned to the law as a means of ensuring economic and social progress, formality began to be respected as order:
laws had to be strictly obeyed because the Party behind them had said

47. See Falco Werkentin, Die Strafjustiz im politischen System der DDR:
Fundstiicke zur Steuerungs- und Eingriffspraxis des zentralen Parteiapparates der SED,
in STEUERUNG DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 93, 111.
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so. But socialists never believed that the impartial observation of legal
rules might produce justice. To them, procedure determined the sequence of steps by which a particular enterprise should be carried out
- a timetable rather than a summary of the rules of the game. In particular, East German legal officials did not see procedure as a method
of allotting strategic advantages to two warring parties that required an
even distribution of bonus points to ensure fairness of outcome. While
judges and prosecutors were taught to observe procedural requirements
carefully, I suspect that they saw no real point to them. And was there?
For example, to judge by the files, East German judges, when signing
arrest warrants, took care to inform the suspect of his right to lodge a
complaint. But almost nobody did, and even if someone was tenacious
enough to follow up on the advice, it virtually never seems to have
made any difference.48 Not surprisingly, GDR courts were very forgiving of missed deadlines and the like, and almost any excuse would do
to change the date of a hearing. Why not, judges seem to have thought.
They attributed no great significance to these matters.
Take the East German attitudes towards defense attorneys. As we
have seen, their position in criminal trials was weak. The system perceived no structural need for their services; no urge to achieve a procedural equilibrium by balancing the weight of the prosecution against the
counterweight of the defense. Some judges and prosecutors seem to
have felt something close to contempt for defense attorneys. "I never
really saw what they got their money for," one Liiritz judge told me.
The same judge, incidentally, had prevented a defense lawyer from using a dictaphone, obtained with great difficulties by way of Sweden, to
record information from the files of a client to which the attorney, as
usual, had access only on the premises of the courthouse. I am sure that
it did not occur to this judge that her interdiction might weaken the
likelihood that the truth about that particular client's offense would
emerge at the trial. Were not she and the prosecutor there to examine
the matter fully?
Attorneys were especially unwelcome in situations involving encounters between citizen and state. If in a civil dispute between private
people one or the other party hired a lawyer to represent solely his or
her interests in court, the inevitable one-sidedness of the lawyer's arguments might put into question their validity but could be tolerated by
the system because, after all, the issue mattered more to the disputants
than to the state. But confrontations between citizen and state were an48. For example, in Liiritz in 1987 out of a total of 126 arrest warrants issued, 23
were challenged by complaints to the Court of Appeals, none of them successfully.

June 1996]

Post-Socialist Germany ·

2297

other matter. Socialism did not like individual challenges to state authority. It liked even less for such challenges to be articulated and
sharpened by professional squabblers. I noted already that attorneys
played a lesser role in East German criminal procedure than in civil
cases.49 They played virtually no role at all in administrative matters.
Without judicial review, they lacked, for one thing, the proper stage to
parade their talents: the courtroom. But even nonforensic lawyering appeared suspicious to GDR authorities if it pitted a citizen against his
government. Attorneys were not supposed to assist clients with applications for an exit visa, for example. They were not supposed to help citizens draft complaints against the administration. When in 1986 a Berlin
woman used the services of her attorney to submit a petition to the
Minister of Justice, she caused a minor uproar in the Ministry, and the
file made its way all the way up to the Minister himself. "This is not
what I imagine to be a lawyer's proper role," a high official noted in
the margins of the lawyer's brief. "Yes," the Minister himself added
approvingly.
No intermediary should come between the citizen and the parental
state.50 It is no accident that East German attitudes towards criminal
procedure resemble American pre-Gault51 views of the juvenile justice
system: ranking the court's "care and solicitude," 52 and, if necessary,
punishment and control, as more beneficial to a defendant than the manipulative services of a lawyer. Even those former judges or prosecutors
who speak with respect of a particular attorney do not appear to have
seen him as a legitimate opponent to be reckoned with. One Liiritz
prosecutor, for example, mentioned with pleasure the rare spunk and
belligerence of one of the local attorneys. Did his combativeness
achieve more for his client than the more typical cautious defense of the
other lawyers, I asked. "No, not really," the prosecutor replied. "But it
made for a more thrilling trial."

49. See StPO § 63, Cj[ 1 (1979), GBl. I 139 (G.D.R.); supra text accompanying
note 33.
50. The tenn was coined by HAROLD J. BERMAN. JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 282 (rev. ed. 1963).
51. In its decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the parental infonnality of the American juvenile justice process as well-meaning but illusory and insisted instead that juvenile defendants, like adults, were in need of, and entitled to, the basic constitutional protections of due process.
52. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909) (articulating the hopes of early refonners for a warm and parental juvenile justice system).
The phrase is cited, almost nostalgically, by the Supreme Court in Gault, 387 U.S. at
15.
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Not all GDR jurists viewed procedure with equal cynicism. But
most, I believe, respected legal formality, if at all, for its surface qualities: as decoration, as the caprice of one's superior, as a hoop to jump
through; at best, as a schedule ensuring the orderly execution of one's
tasks. Although many lawyers took obvious pride in their professional
skills and liked to get their i's dotted and t's crossed, one gets the impression of aesthetic pleasure rather than of philosophical commitment.
Few, it seems to me, saw formality as a sine qua non of justice. I remember a conversation with the former director of a regional court
about a lengthy lawsuit between two neighbors over the height of a
hedge between their gardens. The case had originated in Liiritz, had
traveled back and forth between the Liiritz District Court and the Regional Court of Appeals, and after several years (and, as I knew from
other sources, after the pulling of Party and Stasi strings) had been decided by Supreme Court cassation. My conversation partner was clearly
annoyed at the outcome of the case, in which her own court, which had
stood firm in resisting high level pressure to favor one of the parties, finally had been overruled by the Supreme Court. "All this to-do about a
hedge," she said. "It was all so silly. We had to laugh about it." The
manipulation had offended her professional sense of honor but not her
sense of justice.
It is this different attitude toward form which lies at the heart of
most cognitive dissonances now clouding East-West German interactions. I have had difficulties, for example, explaining to East German
lawyers why that popular GDR practice of judges' regularly giving legal advice to citizens whom they might later encounter as plaintiffs or
defendants in the courtroom might conflict with judicial impartiality;
why trials conducted before an "invited public" to drive home a particular moral lesson must have favored a particular outcome of the case
and therefore could not be called unprejudiced; or why in reunited Germany neofascists cannot more easily be locked up. Even if East German
judges observed what to us loqks like demands of procedural fairness,
they often would do so for motives quite different from our own. A former Liiritz judge once told me about a case involving a prosecution for
attempted rape. As luck would have it, not only the judge but also the
prosecutor and both lay assessors had been female. When the defendant,
aghast at this phalanx of women, complained about their likely lack of
sympathy for his case, the judge adjourned until the next day and went
in ·search of some male lay assessors. Why did you do that, I asked.
"Why, what use is a trial if the defendant is so upset that he won't talk
to us?" she replied. It was not fairness she had been after but effective
pedagogy.

June 1996)

Post-Socialist Germany

2299

Nonlawyers in the ex-GDR share this incomprehension over legal
formality. The civil rights activist Barbel Bohley's famous complaint "We hoped for justice, but we got the Rechtsstaat" - echoes the disappointment of people who longed for substantive justice and instead
had to make do with the intricate and bewildering rules of an essentially
foreign game. Today, many East Germans believe that they have been
given stones instead of bread. What good can come of all these complicated forms? And, for that matter, what good has come?

***
To sum up, East German legal professionals were not generalists
but specialists, with relatively brief and narrow training, much lower
status than Western jurists, little professional cohesiveness, accustomed
to close supervision and control, unaggressive, supportive rather than
critical, inexperienced in the free-for-all of Western litigation, and probably without much respect for, or even understanding of, the significance of legal forms. No doubt about it-they were different. As the
second man in the Berlin Administration of Justice, Detlef Borrmann,
once told me: "They don't fit." For Undersecretary Borrmann, it was
this lack of fit rather than any individual guilt that justified the Berlin
policy of excluding all but 15% of East Berlin's judges and prosecutors
from the united city's administration of justice.53
But then, how could they "fit"? East German jurists are the products of their society, and it would be miraculous if they were not. Their
entire country, one might argue, "does not fit," emerging, as it is, from
a confining, coddling, and manipulating system of government in which
law that needs freedom, contention, private property, money, and a market to flourish played only a minor role. East German citizens, in this
sense, "do not fit": used to withdrawing from an overbearing state into
their private lives, inexperienced in the interactions of civil society, unaccustomed to being left out in the cold, afraid of the competitiveness
of the market, unfamiliar with its laws. As Gregor Gysi once said: East
German citizens lived "as in a monarchy. " 54 Rules did not always hold,
connections counted more than entitlements, decisions were never final,
law just as easily could give way to leniency as to oppression.
But East German lawyers were not only marked by the society
from which they came. They were also, in significant ways, misfits in

53. See Jutta Limbach, Der Aufbau des Rechtswesens in den ostlichen Bezirken
Berlins, 46 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFf 2499 (1993).
54. Gregor Gysi, Ober die Rechtsanwaltschaft im System der DDR, 24
WIRTSCHAFTSREClIT 43, 44 (1993).
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this society. This is most obviously true for the attorneys who (ex of
ficio, so to speak) were expected to have a different opinion from the
prosecution's and thus incorporated "a tiny bit of opposition" 55 in a
system afraid of discord. Not surprisingly, they always were viewed
with suspicion. "Liberalist loners," the Minister of Justice Hilde
Benjamin called them at a 1958 meeting on the state of East Germany's
administration of justice. "The weakest link" in the system, her Undersecretary Heinrich Toeplitz (who, two years, later would become President of the Supreme Court) agreed.56 At that time, the campaign to domesticate the East German Bar by grouping its members in lawyers'
collectives - so-called "colleges" - was in its fifth year; a little over
half of all East German attorneys had been organized in colleges.57
By the end of the GDR, 96% of the country's 606 attorneys were
members of collectives,58 and most of them, motivated by what seemed
a mixture of professional contrariness and a healthy instinct for what is
feasible and profitable, had made some kind of uneasy peace with the
system.59 But the profession never lost its faintly capitalist perfume of
manipulative and clever contentiousness. Ordinary citizens, too, appeared put off by what they saw as a lawyer's excessive preoccupation
with private interests. We know this from complaints about attorneys
submitted to the Ministry of Justice, which almost always criticize either the financial morals of attorneys or their supposedly slick and polemic ways of serving their clients. The comments also show how
deeply at least some East German citizens had become imbued with the
Party's dislike of discord. "In my opinion, no attorney practicing in our
country should be allowed to behave in such fashion," a man complaining about the aggressive lawyering of his ex-wife's attorney writes
in 1987. Another disappointed litigant in 1988: "Until now, I believed
that lawyers practicing in our state had to fairly defend the interests of
our citizens instead of spending all their energies on the one client who
paid them." And, in March 1989, a complainant criticizes an attorney
whose name I recognize from mY Liiritz files: "Instead of seeking conciliation, he only searched for conflict. I was unpleasantly surprised to
55. Id. at 43.
56. A report on the meeting is contained in a collection of documents on East German lawyers' collectives, or "colleges," now held by the Federal Archives in Potsdam.
57. See Thomas Lorenz, Die "Kollektivierung" der Rechtsanwaltschaft - als
Methode zur systematischen Abschaffung der freien Advokatur, in STEUERUNG DER JusTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 409, 426.
58. Id.
59. See Lorenz, supra note 57, at 427 ("The majority of (East German) attorneys
had made their peace with the circumstances in which they found themselves; only a
fraction fought aggressively for the preservation and extension of civic rights.").
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find that such demeanor is tolerated in our legal system." Note the emphasis on "our" c;:ountry in these letters. Attorneys, even in a collective
state like the GDR, stand for "my" and "mine." Asked by the Ministry
to comment on the complaint, the Liiritz attorney gives the reply that
every Western lawyer also would have given: the complainant "fails to
see that I must exclusively represent the interests of my client. " 60
In GDR times, it was not always easy to apply a lawyer's special
skills to this task. A legal system that does not believe in precedents,
for example (because not the older but the most current decision incorporates the correct Party line), does not reward a lawyer for the clever
comparative analysis of case law. Still, in the course of the years, the
East German legal system relaxed many of its ideological assumptions.
Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, legal reasoning became increasingly ambitious. While courts still would not cite other courts' decisions, an attorney might use them to support his client's viewpoint in
oral arguments or in his briefs. The East German law journal Neue
Justiz, on its back cover, carried short summaries of recent case law,
which conscientious lawyers would cut out and collect for future reference. Supreme Court case law, which since 1977 appeared only in a
xeroxed, limited, and classified edition and which, for lawyers, was
very hard to come by in the early 1980s,61 had become fairly easily
available by the middle of the decade and - away from printed records
- was cited. And there were other - in the Western sense, lawyer-like
- methods by which an attorney np.ght further his client's interests: in
a divorce suit, he could carefully establish the couple's assets, for example, or in a prosecution for theft, he could dispute the value of the stolen objects. East German attorneys routinely used legal arguments to
bolster individual autonomy: a decidedly "unsocialist" approach to law.
East German judges and prosecutors, too, by their professional attitudes and training were set apart from other survivors of socialism. All
were taught to be orderly and meticulous in their work. All shared skills
that at least potentially facilitat.ed their dissociation from an essentially
fuzzy and ideologically loaded legal system: the arts of close reading,
of precise articulation, of unambiguous definition, of analogical reasoning. These faculties should help them to adapt far more easily than their
compatriots to the new times. Take a 1980 case from the Liiritz archive
60. The complaints, and the responses, were investigated and filed by the Ministry
of Justice of the GDR and are now held by the Federal Archives in Potsdam.
61. In the early 1980s, attorneys from Liiritz wanting to check up on Supreme
Court case law had to travel to the regional capital to use the only copy of the "Supreme Court Informations" available to lawyers in the region, which was kept at the
head office of the regional lawyers' college.
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that exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of socialist adjudication. It is a cohabitation case from one of the villages in the court's district. After ten years of life together during which a couple pooled all
its efforts and resources, the woman died, leaving the couple's common
savings of more than DM 15,000 in a bank account under the woman's
name. A law suit between the surviving cohabitant and the woman's
statutory heirs followed, and the Liiritz court decided that since the savings were held in the woman's name, they were her property and under
the rules of succession would have to go to a niece. The decision was
upheld upon appeal. Knowing the protagonists and their life history first
hand, the entire village was outraged. The mayor wrote to the Supreme
Court suggesting that the judgment be quashed by way of cassation (a
certiorari-type proceeding, also called "review in the supervisory instance," that was initiated by the Supreme Court itself, usually upon
suggestions by other institutions or by the parties). The Supreme Court
wrote back a sympathetic and carefully worded reply that in effect said:
"Sorry, law is law."
Two features of this case stand out: the fact that all three courts,
contrary to socialist philosophy, sided with formal and against substantive justice and their unimaginative way of doing so. An American
court, faced with the same facts, would have looked for unjust enrichment, implied contract, or some other device that might at least have
salvaged the survivor's own contributions to the couple's savings.62 In
other words, an American court would have manipulated formal law in
its search for justice, and with a perfectly good conscience, too. Socialist judges probably were too cautious and respectful to do so. As one
West German judge said about his new East German colleagues: "They
lack interpretive courage." "We would have been more precise," a former East German judge, now an attorney, told me when she described
the differences between West German judges and her own former self.
"We seem to have approached legal problems with clenched teeth," she
added. Today, former East GefIJlan jurists seem a little shocked at some
of the practices they encounter in capitalist courts, such as the surreptitious plea-bargaining increasingly common even in West German criminal procedure. East German judges obeyed the law. They did not cut
deals about it, and they certainly did not play with it. But their respect
for the letter of the law sets GDR judges and prosecutors far apart from
ordinary socialist citizens, who could not care less about the law,
evaded it whenever possible and desirable, and at best accorded it Iim62. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1967).
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ited instrumental use. Unlike their landsmen, East German jurists already have taken the first step towards the Rechtsstaat: formalism. The
next step - filling that form with life - will be easier for them than
for anybody else in the ex-GDR.

***
I have drawn a contradictory picture of East German jurists: different from ourselves, yet also similar; both in line and at odds with the
society they come from; not quite socialist fish nor capitalist fowl. Most
of them greeted the Wende with anxious optimism. It threatened the security of their routines, but it also promised to relieve them of the ambiguities of their work. No more of that "dialectical unity of legality and
Party spirit" under which at any moment "Party spirit" could undermine and defeat legality. At a meeting of Kreisgericht directors in December 1989 called to assess the situation after the collapse of the Wall,
the Lii.ritz court director wrote into her notebook: "No more discussions
about ongoing proceedings. No guidance by the Supreme Court or the
Regional Court." "From now on, courts will enjoy considerably more
authority than they did in the past," the director of the Rostock Regional Court asserted in a letter of December 14, 1989, addressed to the
mayor of Rostock in which she requested the use of the Rostock Secret
Police headquarters, now vacated, to serve as an annex to her crowded
courthouse. Elsewhere in the GDR, former Stasi buildings were similarly claimed or reclaimed for judicial use.63 Those were symbolic
moves: the Secret Police driven out by the Rule of Law.
But one can also hear the worried tremor of voices whistling in the
dark. With the growing anarchy of post-Wende days, and with mounting
public anger at those who for decades had ordered citizens about,
judges and prosecutors too began to fear for their positions. A "Justice
Committee," set up, as in many other East German towns, by the Lii.ritz
City Council to investigate "injustices, misuses of authority, and unjustified privileges" of state functionaries, soon got sidetracked by largely
exaggerated stories of Party luxuries and never accused local courts of
any wrongdoing. But their association with an authoritarian and corrupt
regime condemned judges and prosecutors nonetheless. I doubt that
most felt very guilty: looking back upon their disciplined and modest
professional lives, they probably thought that they had done the best
they could. "Judges can produce no better case law than their legal sys-

63. In Potsdam, for instance, the district court in 1989 moved back into its tum-ofthe-century courthouse that for many years had been occupied by the Stasi. See
MARKovrrs, supra note 3, at 165.

2304

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:2270

tern will support," the Liiritz court director wrote in her lecture notes at
yet another judges' meeting in February 1990. Would it be enough of
an excuse?
From the first days of the Wende, GDR lawyers thus oscillated between hope and fear. But in the months immediately following the collapse of socialism, hope was dominant. A former judge once described
to me the first and last meeting of the East German Association of
Judges (Richterbund, dissolved, and swallowed by the West German
Judges' League, upon Reunification Day) in June 1990 in East Berlin's
biggest courthouse, the former Stadtgericht in the Littenstrasse: how
judges had come from all over the GDR to take part in a new beginning, crowding the balconies around the building's beautiful rotunda,
dizzy with the sudden changes, excited by their new autonomy, fearful
of the future. 64
But in those early days, East German lawyers still believed that
they could play a part in it. Relations between East and West German
lawyers seemed simple. Common seminars and working groups sprang
from the ground like mushrooms. West Germans were encouraging and
supportive. East Germans were eager to learn: looking for advice, for
inspiration, for allies for the days of reckoning that looked more and
more inevitable. They also were willing to inspect their own past, discover what went wrong, acknowledge guilt, and learn from their mistakes. When they were searching for words to describe and denounce
the past, East Germans did not yet fear that everything they said would
be held against them. The GDR Richterbund, for instance, developed
criteria for a self-examination process that would weed out those too
deeply compromised by their subordination to the Party, and the term
"vorauseilender Gehorsam" ("anticipatory obedience") figured in the
East Germans' own catalogue of socialist sins. Their belief in the need
for change was tempered by fears for their own survival. But it was not
yet buried under West German suspicions.
Because of its many legal implications, lawyers seemed natural
leaders in the GDR's political transformation. More than others, they
had at least some of the skills needed in the new society: arguing, bargaining, familiarity with legal forms. For the first time in GDR history,
lawyers began to occupy positions of political influence: Gregor Gysi
(head of the new Party for Democratic Socialism), Lothar de Maiziere
(first Prime Minister). I believe that GDR lawyers would have made
good mediators between East and West: sharing the social concerns of
64. See also Andreas Gangel, Die DDR-Justiz im Prozess der "Wende," in
supra note 2, at 429.

STEUERUNG DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR,
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their fellow citizens but more than they willing to concede the need for
rules; confused ~emselves, but better able to articulate their confusion
and with a better grasp of what one needed to learn.
In the event, West German reconstruction policies excluded no
other East German professional group from participating in the remaking of their own country as thoroughly as legal professionals. Today,
those former judges and prosecutors who passed the vetting process are,
as a rule, too young, too inexperienced, and too preoccupied with learning the ropes to be able or willing to push for reform. East German lawyers presently in private practice - most of whom are not former attorneys but ex-judges, -prosecutors, -jurisconsults, and newly admitted
Diplomjuristen - are struggling to survive in the new market and also
are unlikely to peddle reform proposals with the smell of socialism.
Former socialist academics have disappeared from East German law
faculties. As a result, the legal debate in the Federal Republic is dominated by Westerners. When in 1991 the German Association of Administrative and Constitutional Law Teachers convened to discuss East Germany's integration into the rule of law, not a single East German law
teacher spoke up and, for all I know, was even invited.65 When a year
later the first postreunification Convention of German Lawyers took
place in Hannover, of the roughly 2600 participants, only about twentyfive had come from the new East German states.66 East German jurists
do not appear at national meetings, have no real voice other than the
PDS and the journal Neue Justiz (the first considered disreputable, the
second ignored by most Westerners), and are unlikely to leave a mark
on the profession. The rule of law in Germany's Eastern half - conceived by Westerners, built by Westerners, staffed with Westerners, and,
by all signs, efficiently and smoothly run by Westerners - is likely to
remain for some time a largely Western enterprise.
I see two problems with this development. One concerns legal culture in the former GDR. Truly democratic reform must be self-made.
Yet East Germans today do not.experience the Rechtsstaat as something
self-made, but as something others - West Germans - imposed on
65. See Der Rechtsstaat und die Aufarbeitung der vorrechtsstaatlichen
Vergangenheit, Berichte und Diskussionen auf der Tagung der Vereinigung der
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer in Giessen vom 2. bis 5. Oktober 1991, 51 VVDSTRL 9
(1992).
66. See Horst Sendler, Gesamtdeutscher Juristentag?, 25 ZEITSCHRIF'f FiiR
REcHTSPOLITIK 449 (1992). Sendler also reports that at the previous annual convention
in September, 1991 - post-Wende but pre-unification - of the roughly 3500 participants, about 300 had come from East Germany - evidence of the cautious optimism
East German lawyers, at that time, still felt when considering their own role in the establishment of the Rechtsstaat.
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them from the outside. The West German colonization of East Germany's administration of justice deprived East Germans of a role and
voice in their own liberation and turned events that might have been cathartic into impositions. That may be one of the reasons why East
Germans today seem strangely disaffected by the legal system that they
themselves use in ever-growing numbers. According to a 1995 opinion
poll, 53% of East Germans consider their present social system to be
unfair; 73% believe that the law does not ensure equal protection; 60%
are dissatisfied with German case law and legislation; and 72% do not
feel protected by the law.67 The rule of law has not won over the hearts
and minds of former socialists.
My second worry concerns historic memory in Germany. It is always difficult to face unpleasant periods and events as part of one's
own make-up. West Germany avoided that look into the mirror when, in
1951, it quietly integrated former Nazi judges and prosecutors into its
new administration of justice. Today, the almost total exchange of legal
elites in the former GDR - West for East - may well prevent both
sides' coming to terms with Germany's communist and anticommunist
past. Usually, proponents of a thorough cleansing of socialist officialdom advance just the opposite argument: we must not repeat our postwar leniency towards the Nazis, they say, that also enabled us to stay
mute about the crimes of the regime that they represented. Even assuming that the evils of Hitler and Honecker could be equated, that argument is unpersuasive. The integration of Nazi judges and prosecutors
was an internal West German affair: one hand washed the other, and the
resulting silence lulled the consciences of both pardoners and pardoned.
The present German reunification process is a coming together of opposites, with built-in discords and clashes, and the inevitable criticism and
disagreement arising on both sides should make it impossible to sweep
past injustices silently under the carpet. But the uneven distribution of
power and the fact that in the process of national soul-searching only
the victors may pose all the qu.estions raises another danger: that under
the weight of Western accusations, East Germans become defensive,
clam up, excuse behavior they otherwise would criticize, and begin to
look upon the search for historic truth as other peoples' business. A recent study of East European attitudes towards the socialist past seems to
justify this fear: despite the fact that the East Germans supported their
regime with less reluctance than did most of their socialist neighbors,
they are today less likely to find fault with their own biographies than
67. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewusstsein im wiedervereinigten
Deutsch/and, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR REcHTSSOZIOLOGIE 121, 123-25 (1995).
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former Czechs· or Romanians. 68 Ideally, the process of Germany's
reunification coul~ have been a historic learning process for both sides.
Instead, West German self-righteousness and East German defensiveness are likely to block, once again, a difficult and troubling past from
German view.

***
But perhaps I have drawn a typically German picture of events:
unnecessarily ponderous and gloomy and with an exaggerated view of
the significance of ideology. Perhaps what people think matters not
nearly so much as how they actually behave. Perhaps, instead of arguing that things went badly, one could with equal justification argue that
they went extraordinarily well. East German courts are functioning
smoothly and efficiently. Litigation rates are soaring.69 In Liiritz, where
in 1988 five judges (three of them women) had decided an annual total
of 1027 cases, in 1995, eight judges (all of them men, and only one an
East German) together decided 4494 cases.70 Over 1200 suits alone
were filed by tenants complaining about rent increases after the recent
easing of rent controls in East Germany - the new citizens use the law
to defend their interests. Instead of three attorneys, as in socialist days,
Liiritz now has thirty-three: twenty-three West Germans and ten East
Germans, among them several former judges and prosecutors who did
not pass, or did not try to pass, the vetting process. Although several of
them are struggling, some of the Western newcomers also find it hard to
hold their own against the competition.
East German citizens seem to prefer East German counsel: not
only because they are cheaper but also because they are more sympathetic and attentive listeners. At present, legal business in the former
GDR seems to be distributed in line with the pre-Wende structural differences between the two legal systems: personal matters, like family or
68. See Uwe Ewald, Strafrecht und Umgang mit der staatssozialistischen
Vergangenheit in Liindern Mittel- und Osteuropas, in "UNRECHrSSTAAT"? POLITISCHE
JUSTIZ UND DIE AUFARBErruNG DER DDR-VERGANGENHEIT 64 (Lothar Bisky et al. eds.,
1994).
69. First-instance civil law case loads in the five new East Gennan states rose
from a total of76,800 new suits filed in 1991to317,600 suits filed in 1994. See Sabine
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Wege zur Justizentlastung, 48 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 2441 (1995). In 1988, in the then-GDR, a total of 62,210 first-instance civil
cases were filed. See STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 1989, at 399.
70. The figures include cases from civil, family, and criminal law, but exclude labor law disputes, which no longer are adjudicated in Liiritz, but now go to a special labor court in a nearby town serving a much larger area than the present Liiritz
Amtsgericht.
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labor law disputes, tend to go to East German attorneys, moderate-size
financial disputes. go to both East and West German lawyers, and the
big; complex, and financially rewarding litigation is handled by West
German law firms or by their East German branch offices. Native East
German lawyers occasionally complain about this unwritten pecking order, report tensions between East and West members of some new
"mixed" law offices, or are hurt by what they perceive as West Gennan
snootiness or exclusivity. "What we now lack most is callousness," one
East German attorney told a British interviewer.71 Even if the statement
exaggerates the callousness of Western lawyers, it correctly reflects East
German perceptions of what the Rechtsstaat is about and is a testimony
to what went wrong in Germany's legal reunification. "Have you
changed since the Wende?" I asked an attorney in my little town. "I
hope not," he replied, "at least not in my basic attitudes." But he admitted to some change already: he no longer accepts clients whom he
knows will be unlikely ever to pay him. And when I recently called him
again and found him strangely inattentive during our conversation, he
revealed a further symptom of adjustment. "You must excuse me," he
said; "But while we're talking, I am also trying to fix something on my
computer screen."

***
If you look up "lustration" in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of 1971, you will find a definition reflecting simpler times:
"Purificatory ceremony performed as a preliminary to entering a holy
place. " 72 The religious emphasis should give us pause. The Rechtsstaat
is no holy place. On the contrary, it is a place structured by laws that
are well aware of its unholy nature. The rule of law does not strive for
a "new man" but trusts that the old Adam, if only he sticks to the rules
of the game, can govern himself. Even the old socialist Adam.

71. Gisela Shaw, East German "Rechtsanwiilte" and German Unification, 61 GER·
MAN

LIFE AND LETIERS, NEW SERIES no. 2, at 211, 224 (1994).
72. WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1348 {16th ed. 1971).

